This paper derives an optimal allocation rule (α*) that (i) assigns a share of the transaction price to the buyer-side of the two-sided market; (ii) is equivalent to the Rochet-Tirole price structure rule; and (iii) is a function of the own/cross-price elasticities. For linear demands, demand symmetry is sufficient for α* = ½ and α* is decreasing (increasing) in the own-price (cross-price) sensitivity parameter of buyer-side demand.
Introduction
Over the past decade, a growing literature has emerged on two-sided markets. A two-sided market is a market in which one side of the market requires the participation of the other side of the market in order for there to be a viable enterprise-the proverbial "chicken and egg problem." The platform provider solves this problem by using prices as instruments to bring both sides of the market on board. Examples include auctions, credit cards, dating bars, newspapers, video consoles and Yellow Pages (Rysman, 2009 , Wright, 2004a .
Broadband markets constitute another prominent example of a two-sided market in which the broadband provider serves as the intermediary connecting content providers with individual subscribers. In the United States, the Federal Communications Commission is currently deciding upon its role in regulating broadband markets under the rubric of net neutrality, including possible constraints on the structure of broadband pricing (FCC, 2009 ). For example, should regulators prohibit broadband providers from charging content providers, the so-called zero-price mandate, 1 The platform provider in a two-sided market faces two different pricing decisions-the level of the transaction price and the structure of the transaction price. The structure of the transaction price is simply an allocation of the transaction price between the buyer side and the seller side of the market so as to maximize the volume of usage. Modeling the price structure rule as an optimal allocation problem may serve to clarify some confusion in the literature regarding its economic interpretation.
or from engaging in price discrimination?
An understanding of the structure of pricing in two-sided markets is also important from an antitrust perspective. All too often antitrust authorities apply one-sided logic to two-sided markets. That is to say, antitrust authorities tend to focus on the total transaction price or the price on only one-side of the market, the buyer-side, for example, without due consideration of the interplay between the two sides of the market. The EU Commission's recent examination of the multilateral interexchange fees assessed by MasterCard and Visa are two prominent examples (European Commission, 2008 .
The primary objectives of this article are three-fold. First, we demonstrate that the Rochet-Tirole price structure rule is equivalent to an optimal allocation rule that assigns an optimal share (α*) of the transaction price to the buyer-side of the two-sided market. Second, we show that α* is a function of the underlying own-price and cross-price elasticities. Third, we develop comparative statics for α* based on linear demand functions.
The key findings of this analysis based on linear demand functions are as follows: (i) demand symmetry is sufficient for α* = ½; (ii) α* < ½ for independent demands when buyer-side demand is more price-sensitive than seller-side demand; (iii) α* is decreasing in the buyer-side own-price sensitivity parameter, ceteris paribus; and (iv) α* is increasing in the buyer-side cross-price sensitivity parameter, ceteris paribus.
Optimal Price Allocations
Let the transaction price level be given by = + , where is the transaction price to the buyer and is the transaction price to the seller. The price structure is determined by the allocation of p between and = where α
2 Let ( , ) and ( , ) denote the number of buyers and sellers, respectively, and let c denote the marginal cost of the transaction. The profit for the platform provider is given by
Following Rochet and Tirole (2006) and Schmalensee (2002) , for a given , the optimal price structure is obtained by maximizing the volume of usage ( ), or ( ) = max { ( , ) ( , ) under the constraint that + = }. The platform provider's problem for finding the optimal allocation rule, α*, is given by
Provided that (2) is concave in α, the first-order condition is both necessary and sufficient for a maximum and yields an optimal allocation rule that is a function of the own-price and cross-price elasticities.
2 In certain cases, one side of the market may be "bribed" to participate in which case α* is not bounded on [0, 1] . 3 The price level is determined by a standard "Lerner Index" expression, or − = 1 η , where
is the elasticity of volume with respect to total price. 4 Notably, whether the market is one-sided (two-sided) turns on whether Proposition 1. The optimal allocation rule for the transaction price is given by
For independent demands, 5 η = η = 0 and the optimal allocation rule in (4) implies that
The expression in braces in (4) is the familiar price structure rule of Rochet and Tirole (2003) .
Proposition 2. In the case of independent demands, the optimal allocation rule in (4) is equivalent to the Rochet-Tirole price structure rule:
The Rochet-Tirole price structure rule has given rise to some confusion in the literature because it appears to suggest that the allocation of the transaction price is increasing as opposed to decreasing with the own-price elasticity of demand, contrary to intuition.
6 Krueger (2009) provides clarification of this issue by recognizing that the price structure rule holds only in equilibrium and that each of the elasticities is itself a function of the particular price level. This article builds on these important insights by deriving the relevant comparative statics and formally characterizing the demand conditions under which it is optimal to deviate from a symmetric allocation of the price burden in the case of independent and interdependent linear demands.
Linear Demands

Independent Demands
Let the linear demand functions for the buyer and seller side of the market be given, respectively, by
Independent demands refer to demands that are independent across the two sides of the market. This is a standard assumption in the two-sided markets literature. See, for example, Rochet and Tirole (2003) and Schmalensee (2002 Proposition 3. When demands are linear and given by (5) and (6), the optimal (efficient) allocation rule is given by
where is independent of p.
The proof is immediate upon substituting (5) and (6) into (2) and recognizing that the resulting profit function is concave in α. It is straightforward, albeit somewhat tedious, to show that (7) and (4) are equivalent.
It is noteworthy that α * falls below ½ in (7) when > 0 ⇒ > , or > � �. Hence, when = , the buyer side of the market bears a smaller burden of the transaction price when > , or when the own-price sensitivity parameter for the buyer side of the market is greater than the own-price sensitivity parameter for the seller side of the market. This result accords with economic intuition in that there is an inverse relationship between the allocation of the price burden and the own-price sensitivity parameter, ceteris paribus.
Two corollaries follow directly from Proposition 3.
Corollary 1. For symmetric linear demands (or more generally when / = / ),
Corollary 2. (i)
Corollary 1 establishes that symmetry of demands is sufficient for an optimal allocation of α * = ½ that divides the transaction price equally across the two sides of the market.
Corollary 2 indicates that as demand becomes more price-sensitive on one side of the market, it is efficient to decrease the allocation of the transaction price 7 We can refer to α * as the efficient allocation rule here because, at least for linear, independent demands, the monopolist's rule for allocating the transaction price across the two sides of the market is also efficient. See Rochet and Tirole (2003, p. 29) . Moreover, as Weyl (2009a, p. 6) observes, "The price balance chosen by the monopolist may well be optimal and when it is not it may be difficult to determine which direction it would be beneficial for it to move." See also Weyl (2009b) . 8 This expression represents an equality of reservation prices. I am grateful to an anonymous referee for this observation.
on that side of the market. This is a variation on the seesaw principle of pricing in two-sided markets. To wit, a higher price on one side of the market is commonly associated with a lower price on the other side of the market (Rochet and Tirole, 2006) . This result is of potential interest to antitrust authorities because there may be a tendency to focus on an increase in price on one side of the market without due consideration of a countervailing decrease in price on the other side of the market.
Interdependent Demands
Let the linear interdependent demand functions for the buyer and seller side of the market be given, respectively, by
where all parameters are positive with Proposition 4. When demands are linear and given by (8) and (9), the optimal allocation rule is given by
, where
10 9 An example of interdependent demands is the credit-card models of Rochet and Tirole (2002) and Wright (2004) where competing merchants accept cards for strategic reasons. In the creditcard framework, the merchants' quasi-demand, n S , depends on both the cardholder fee and the merchant fee. I am grateful to Julian Wright for this example. See Chakravorti (2010) for a survey of the payment cards literature.
The proof is immediate upon substituting (8) and (9) into (2) and recognizing that the resulting profit function is concave in α under Assumption 1. It is straightforward, albeit somewhat tedious, to show that (10) is equivalent to (3). In addition, note that when the cross effects are identically zero, = = 0 and (10) reduces to (7).
In order to develop the intuition for ( ) and relate it to the case of independent demands, it is instructive to rewrite the expression as ( ) = ( ) − / ( ), where
( ) is the equation for the equality of reservation prices and / ( ) is its "transpose" obtained by interchanging d and f. In addition, the term in the first set of parentheses on the right-hand side of (11) is the expression for k when demands are independent.
As in the independent demands case, symmetry of demands is sufficient for the optimal allocation of α * = ½ that divides the transaction price equally across the two sides of the market. 
Corollary 4. (i)
The economic intuition underlying Corollary 4 is the same as that for Corollary 2. A small increase in the own-price sensitivity parameter on one side of the market increases the allocation of the price burden on the other side of the market, ceteris paribus.
Corollary 5 provides the comparative statics for the cross-price sensitivity parameters. A small increase in the cross-price sensitivity parameter shifts the optimal allocation of the price burden in the opposite direction as that for a small increase in the own-price sensitivity parameter, ceteris paribus. Formally, 11 That the numerator is negative in (i) and positive in (ii) follows directly from Assumption 1. For example, in the numerator of (i),
12 That the numerator is positive in (i) and negative in (ii) follows directly from the assumption that > 0 and > 0 ∀α ∈ [0,1]. increase in the own-price (cross-price) sensitivity parameter is to increase (decrease) the price burden on the other side of the market. It follows that the effect of a small increase in either the own-price or cross-price sensitivity parameter is to decrease the price associated with that parameter.
Conclusion
This article derives an optimal allocation rule (α*) that (i) assigns a share of the price burden to the buyer-side of the market; (ii) is equivalent to the RochetTirole price structure rule for two-sided markets; and (iii) is a function of the underlying own/cross-price elasticities. The comparative static results for linear demands are consistent with economic intuition-symmetry of demands is sufficient for α* = ½ and α* is decreasing (increasing) in the own-price (crossprice) sensitivity parameter of buyer-side demand, ceteris paribus.
